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I. INTRODUCTION
Although a personal right,1 the assistance of counsel has come to
be acknowledged as an essential requisite to the establishment of
criminal culpability. The essence of Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment based jurisprudence, with regard to one's right to counsel, is a
recognition of the function a trained advocate plays in our adversarial
judicial system. The attorney demands payment of the client's "due
bill," issued by the government under mandate of constitutional or
statutory provision, to each of her citizens. Retained or appointed
counsel helps provide the measure of reliability justifying a constitu-
tional acceptance of a resulting conviction because this "fundamental
fairness" has accompanied the process. Therefore, ever since the
United States Supreme Court officially abandoned the "special cir-
cumstances"2 approach to one's constitutional guarantee of counsel at
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REViEW.
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas. BA. Arkansas
Tech University; J.D. University of Arkansas, Little Rock.
1. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
2. Between 1932 and 1963, any federal accommodation to questions involving a re-
quest for counsel arising in the state arena was grounded on due process under a
"special circumstances" analysis. This approach called for a subjective appraisal
of the totality of the circumstances, primarily focused upon the abilities of the
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trial in 1963, absent a valid waiver, failure to appoint counsel in a
felony prosecution results in an invalid conviction.3
However, the Sixth Amendment has never been held to preclude
trial of an indigent accused of a misdemeanor who has requested and
been refused appointment of counsel. The federal prohibition in this
context simply forbids, at sentencing, the imposition of incarceration
or "jail time."4 Absent a sanction involving loss of one's physical lib-
erty, any resulting conviction is not rendered constitutionally invalid
solely because an attorney has not been provided. Hence, the sound-
ness of an initial misdemeanor conviction, when judged by a right to
counsel test, depends upon whether or not one is sentenced to jail.
Leaving to one side the issue as to whether this line of demarcation
has been properly drawn, once in place it presents a relatively easy
standard to apply, at least as to the initial conviction. Before the
Court's 1994 holding in Nichols v. United States5 when inquiry turned
to the collateral use of the uncounseled misdemeanor adjudication as
a predicate offense for purposes of sentence enhancement, the clarity
disappeared. To suggest that case law addressing the question was
"not in harmony"6 was an understatement of classic proportion. The
degree to which the uncertainty developed was directly attributable to
one United States Supreme Court decision, Baldasar v. Illinois.7 That
case was intended to specifically address the impact of an initial un-
counseled misdemeanor conviction on penalty enhancement for subse-
quent offenses. Because the per curiam opinion in Baldasar provided
no majority rationale for its result, the interpretation of its holding
spawned no less than four differing and contradictory responses from
the lower courts. Now, seven years after a member of the Court ac-
knowledged that its holding had "led to uneven application... and
conflicting decisions in the courts below,"8 Chief Justice Rehnquist,•
defendant and the complexity of the case against him, to glean whether or not
fundamental fairness had been violated by the state's denial of counsel. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349-52 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 344. See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972) (holding
that consideration of a prior uncounseled felony conviction is improper for pur-
poses of sentence enhancement); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967)
(holding that use of an uncounseled felony conviction for purposes of recidivist
statute is not allowed).
4. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
5. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
6. This was one characterization found in State v. Wilson, 684 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984).
7. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
8. Moore v. Georgia, 484 U.S. 904, 905 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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writing for himself and four other members 9 of the Court, has "over-
rule[d]" Baldasar.O The majority in Nichols decided it was indeed
consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to allow a de-
fendant's previous uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for which no
initial jail sentence was imposed to be used to enhance punishment
upon a subsequent conviction.13 In other words, that which is valid in
the first instance retains that status for collateral purposes as well.
Nichols is an important decision in its own right, given the conflict-
ing assessments of Baldasar made by the lower courts and given that
every state as well as the federal government has at least one statute
or other provision calling for an increased sentence upon proof that
the accused has a previous misdemeanor conviction.1 2 But there is
also significance in the analysis the Court used to reach its conclusion.
On the surface, it appears to be simply a consistency of treatment be-
tween the valid and invalid, be it a predicate of felony or misde-
meanor. However, as this Article will demonstrate, the reasoning of
9. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined with the Chief Justice.
Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and Justices Black-
mun, Stevens and Ginsburg dissented.
10. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994).
11. Id.
12. ALA. CODE § 32-5-312 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030 (1989); Amiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-604 (West Supp. 1994); Am. CODE ANN. § 5-65-111 (Michie 1987); CAL.
[VEH.] CODE § 23165 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1202
(West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227a (West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 4175 (Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716 (Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 316-193 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391 (Supp. 1991);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 291-4 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 18-8005 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN.
STAT. Ch. 625, para. 5/11-501 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-5-3
(West 1992); IowA CODE ANN § 321 J.2 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
1567 (Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 § 1312-B
(West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., [Transp.] § 27-101 (1987); MAsS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp. 1992); MICH. Coim. LAws ANN. § 257.625 (West
Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121 (West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-11-30 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.023 (Vernon Supp. 1992); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 61-8-714 (1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-6.196(2) (Reissue 1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 484.3792 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 265:82-b (Supp. 1992); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (Michie Cum.
Supp. 1992); N.Y. [VEH. & TRA.] LAw § 1193 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-138.5 (Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1991); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99 (Anderson 1990, Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 11-902 (West 1988, Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 165.065 (Supp. 1990); 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-27-2.7 (Supp. 1994); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-5-2940 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 32-23-3
(1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-403 (Supp. 1992); TEX. Rev. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 67011-1 (West 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-644 (Supp. 1994)(Amended 1994);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1210 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270 (Michie
Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.515 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE
§ 17c-5-2 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.65 (West 1991, Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT.
§ 31-5-233 (1989).
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Nichols opens the door to a reexamination of the application of even
an uncounseled felony conviction for purposes of sentencing. The
questions raised by Nichols are not merely of academic interest, and
its logical progression has particular currency in the context of crimi-
nal history provisions under state or federal sentencing guidelines.13
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A useful starting point for understanding the potential impact of
Nichols is with an abbreviated consideration of the development and
present parameters associated with the federal constitutional guaran-
tee of trial counsel. Despite the explicit pronouncement found in the
Sixth Amendment,14 prior to 1938 it was not even federal court prac-
tice, except in capital cases, to require appointment of counsel for
those who could not afford an attorney.1 5 It was in Johnson v.
ZerbstL6 that the United States Supreme Court first construed the
Sixth Amendment to require such protection for the impoverished de-
fendant accused of a felony in the federal system. The Court did not
hold this specific right applicable to state prosecutions until its 1963
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.17
Clarence Earl Gideon had been charged in a Florida state court
with breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misde-
meanor. This was a felony offense under Florida law. Appearing in
court without funds, his request for a lawyer was denied.8 State law
provided for appointment of counsel only in capital cases and arguably
he could not have availed himself of "special circumstances" that
would have supported appointment under due process.1 9 Overruling a
1942 precedent, Betts v. Brady,20 which had rejected extending the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states, the Court held, ab-
sent a valid waiver, an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceed-
13. In addition to the federal scheme, presently 23 state jurisdictions have some form
of sentencing guideline law and the list is growing with Massachuetts, Missouri,
and Oklahoma currently looking at such laws. Moreover, 30 years after Gideon,
the constitutional validity of uncounseled felony convictions is still being ad-
dressed by courts in one form or another. See, e.g., Exparte Jordan, 879 S.W.2d
61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
14. The pertinent language of the amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
15. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660-61 (1948).
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Six years before Zerbst, the Court had recognized in Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
assistance of counsel. Thereafter, between 1932 and 1963, a "special circum-
stances" analysis was employed. See supra note 2.
18. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1963).
19. See supra note 2.
20. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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ing must be furnished trial counsel at the state's expense. In sharp
contrast with its characterization of the fundamental fairness of a con-
viction obtained without counsel relied upon in Betts, the Court in
Gideon found it to be "an obvious truth" that "in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided."21
Therefore, an infraction of this constitutional guarantee would render
a conviction void. Additionally, it is one of those "structural defects" in
the trial process which defy analysis by "harmless error" standards.2 2
Given that Gideon was convicted of a felony, and coupled with lan-
guage in the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan,2 3 many lower
courts viewed Gideon as having applicability only to felony cases.2 4
The existence of such a limitation was eventually rejected by the
Court with its 1972 decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin.2 5
The petitioner in Argersinger was an indigent who had been
charged in Florida state proceedings with carrying a concealed
weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment for up to six months,
a $1000 fine, or both. Upon conclusion of a bench trial at which
Argersinger was not represented by counsel, a ninety day jail sentence
was imposed.2 6
In defense of its denial of counsel under these circumstances, the
state contended that an apt analogy could be found with the Court's
cases dealing with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Those
cases permitted crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six
months to be tried without a jury.2 7 The Court rejected this approach,
observing that "the assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the
very existence of a fair trial," and "may well be necessary [for that
purpose] even in a petty-offense prosecution."28 Acknowledging that
Gideon v. Wainwright involved a felony prosecution, the Court never-
theless found Gideon's rationale to be applicable and held that "absent
21. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
22. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
23. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349-52 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Harlan considered it appropriate to abandon a "special circumstances" test
for serious offenses but wrote: "Whether the rule should extend to all criminal
cases need not now be decided." Id. at 351.
24. See David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convic-
tions After Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517, 523-24 nn.25-27 (1982).
25. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
26. Id. at 26.
27. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 160-61 (1968). But see Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S.
538, 548 (1989) (holding that an offense carrying a maximum prison term of six
months or less is presumed to be "petty" and defendant is entitled to jury trial
only if he can demonstrate additional statutory penalties reflecting legislative de-
termination that the offense in question is a "serious" one).
28. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31, 33 (1972).
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a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for
any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, un-
less he was represented by counsel at his trial."2 9
However, Argersinger specifically reserved considering the require-
ments of the Sixth Amendment regarding the right to counsel where
loss of liberty did not occur.30 This in turn created almost as much
uncertainty and conflicting opinion as was meant to be resolved by the
decision itself. Some state and lower federal courts read the opinion to
mandate appointment whenever imprisonment was an authorized
penalty. Others held convictions constitutionally valid as long as no
actual imprisonment resulted.31 Resolution as to what was dictated
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments came seven years subse-
quent to Argersinger with Scott v. Illinois.3 2
In Scott, the indigent and uncounseled defendant had been con-
victed of shoplifting in an Illinois state court. The applicable state
statute set the maximum sanction for such an offense at one year in
jail, a $500 fine, or both. The penalty imposed at the conclusion of
Scott's bench trial had been a fine of fifty dollars.33 The position taken
by the Illinois Supreme Court was an actual imprisonment stan-
dard.34 Under this test, Scott's conviction was constitutionally proper
because only a fine had been extracted. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, Scott contended that the Court's Sixth Amend-
ment decisions, most notably Argersinger, required a state to provide
counsel whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty. Interpret-
ing the thrust, if not the actual holding, of Argersinger as providing
deprivation of personal liberty as the line defining the constitutional
right to appointment, a majority of the Court rejected this conten-
tion.3 5 Thus, a misdemeanor conviction retains its constitutional va-
lidity in the face of a right to counsel argument so long as the
defendant is not actually sentenced to jail.36 But, if not void in the
first instance, can it nevertheless carry the effect of being a nullity for
derivative purposes such as increasing the potential or actual punish-
ment under a recidivist statute?
29. Id. at 37.
30. Id.
31. Rudstein, supra note 24, at 526 nn.41-42.
32. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
33. Id. at 368.
34. People v. Scott, 369 N.E.2d 881, 882 (1977).
35. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979). Then associate Justice Rehnquist
authored the majority opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stewart, Justice White, and Justice Powell.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 414-18 (6th Cir. 1992)(Nelson,
J., concurring); United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496, 499 (2nd Cir. 1991).
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III. USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR PENALTY
ENHANCEMENT
Four years after Gideon was decided, the Court held in Burgett v.
Texas37 that the prosecution could not offer into evidence a prior fel-
ony conviction that was invalid under the dictates of Gideon in an ef-
fort to increase or enhance the defendant's punishment under a repeat
offender's statute. The essence of the lesson from Burgett and its com-
panion cases38 is to prevent erosion of the right to counsel safeguard.
In other words, that which is invalid initially retains such status and
precludes its collateral use for purpose of sentence enhancement.
Presumptively such a conviction would be void on its face whether
or not imprisonment results. Two weeks before Nichols was handed
down, the Court, in Custis v. United States,39 characterized the failure
to appoint counsel as a "unique constitutional defect"40 which was "ju-
risdictional."41 Still, the Court has never held that an uncounseled
conviction, even a felony conviction, is invalid for all purposes. This
point was explicitly made in Lewis v. United States.42
37. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
38. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972) (consideration of prior un-
counseled conviction improper on question of sentence); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
473, 489 (1972) (prior conviction without counsel or waiver not admissible to
impeach).
39. 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994). At issue in Custis was whether or not a defendant in a
federal sentencing proceeding had the right to collaterally attack the validity of
previous state convictions being used to enhance his sentence. Id. at 1734. In
this case, the government was attempting to trigger enhancement provisions
under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1988) [hereinafter
ACCA] by claiming Custis had three prior felony convictions. At the sentencing
hearing, two of three convictions were challenged. The basis of one challenge was
that the defendant's attorney had rendered unconstitutionally ineffective assist-
ance of counsel resulting in a guilty plea that was not knowing and intelligent as
required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Custis v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (1994).
The second ground for relief was a claim that a second conviction had been
based on a "stipulated fact" trial that was the equivalent of a guilty plea and that
this conviction was fundamentally unfair because Custis had not been ade-
quately advised of his rights. An additional claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel was bootstrapped to this second allegation. Id.
The majority opinion, also authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected these
arguments without reaching their merits. Any statutorily based relief was fore-
closed, in part, because the language of the ACCA focused on the mere fact of the
conviction. The constitutional questions were not an option because the claims
being raised were not of "jurisdictional significance." Id. at 1737. The opinion
suggested that only a conviction obtained in violation of the right to counsel was
subject to the type of collateral attack that the defendant wished to mount. Id. at
1739.
40. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1734, 1738 (1969).
41. Id.
42. 445 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980).
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In 1961,43 the petitioner in Lewis, without benefit of counsel, pled
guilty to a felony in a Florida state court and served a term of impris-
onment.44 Sixteen years later, Lewis was arrested and charged with
knowingly receiving and possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a)(1). This particular provision made it a crime for one con-
victed of a felony to possess a firearm. Prior to his trial on this offense,
his attorney informed the court that Lewis had not been represented
by counsel at the 1961 conviction proceeding in violation of Gideon.
Counsel argued that the initial felony conviction could not then be
used to serve as the predicate for a violation of the possession statute.
The trial court rejected this contention, holding the prior conviction
constitutionally immaterial to Lewis' status under the law as a previ-
ously convicted felon. 45
On grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the use of even a conviction obtained in violation of a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the purpose of placing him in
the category of being "presumptively dangerous."46 In order to reach
the constitutional issues, the Court first had to focus on the statute
itself. The Court concluded that nothing on the face of the statute or
in its legislative history suggested a congressional intent to limit the
classification of "convicted" to individuals whose convictions are not
subject to collateral attack.47
In respect to due process concerns, the Court had little trouble in
holding that Congress could rationally find "that any felony convic-
tion, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to
prohibit the possession of a firearm."48 The more difficult hurdle to
overcome was grounded in the Sixth Amendment conventions estab-
lished by Burgett, Tucker v. United States,49 and Loper v. Beto.
50
These three cases were distinguished by noting that the federal gun
43. Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 847 (1971), held Gideon to be fully retroactive.
44. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 56-57 (1980).
45. Id. at 58.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id. at 60. The opinion noted: "The statutory language is sweeping, and its plain
meaning is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until
the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirma-
tive action, such as a qualifying pardon." Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 66.
49. 404 U.S. 443 (1972). Here the Court affirmed a remand by a court of appeals
ordering reconsideration of a sentence that was imposed. Id. at 449. The sen-
tencing judge had considered two previous convictions that were invalid under
Gideon. Id. at 444-45.
One suggestion put forth by the government to try and save the sentence was
that the "relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant has been formally con-
victed of past crimes, but whether and to what extent the defendant has in fact
engaged in criminal or antisocial conduct." Id. at 446. This argument was not
directly rejected; instead it was put aside because the sentencing authority was
not dealing with "a sentence imposed in the informed discretion of a trial judge,
1994]
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laws focused not upon the reliability of the past uncounseled convic-
tion, "but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in order
to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons."51
In the context of a misdemeanor, it seems clear that the initial con-
viction is constitutionally void only if a jail sentence has been levied.
Therefore, a misdemeanor conviction may in fact be "initially valid"
despite the absence of counsel. Neither Scott nor Argersinger ad-
dressed the question of whether a valid uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction not resulting in imprisonment could be used for collateral
purposes. This was the issue that brought Baldasar v. Illinois52 to the
Court.
The facts of Baldasar are relatively simple. Thomas Baldasar was
convicted of misdemeanor theft in May 1975. Under Illinois law at the
time, the maximum penalty available upon a first conviction of this
offense was "not more than a year of imprisonment and a fine of not
more than $1,000."53 No one disputes that during the court proceed-
ing Baldasar was not represented by an attorney nor had he formally
waived his Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel. However, the sen-
tence imposed was a fine of $159 and one year's probation54 which
under Scott and Argersinger would provide the immunity from any
such constitutionally-based attack55 and, hence, a valid conviction for
right to counsel purposes.
The state statutory scheme farther authorized upon a second con-
viction for the same offense that the subsequent crime could be treated
as a felony with the potential punishment range being increased to a
prison term of one to three years.56 Six months after his initial convic-
tion, Baldasar was again charged and found guilty of theft of property
not exceeding $150 in value. 57 This time he was charged with a sec-
ond offense. Represented by a lawyer at this trial, defense counsel
but with a sentence founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitu-
tional magnitude." Id. at 447.
After Lewis and now Nichols, one may question whether a sentencing judge's
discretion would be similarly "uninformed." Particularly, if the issue is not the
conviction itself but its use as an historical reference to a defendant's past crimi-
nal behavior and its weight in that context.
50. 405 U.S. 473 (1972). Here the Court disallowed the use of a Gideon-flawed con-
viction to impeach the general credibility of the defendant. Id. at 483.
51. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980).
52. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
53. Id. at 223.
54. Id.
55. The state appellate opinion, People v. Baldasar, 367 N.E.2d 459 (1977), was
handed down two years before the Scott decision, but interpreted Argersinger as
calling for actual imprisonment as the requisite for appointment of counsel. Id.
at 463.
56. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 223 (1980).
57. Id.
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objected when the prosecution introduced the first misdemeanor con-
viction as evidence of the defendant's recidivist conduct.58 While con-
ceding the earlier 1975 theft conviction to be valid, the essence of the
defense's challenge was that the accused was now being imprisoned as
a direct or collateral result of the prior uncounseled conviction.
Hence, Baldasar asserted that the line drawn in Argersinger, with its
focus upon reliability being the linchpin for finding loss of one's liberty
to be constitutionally impermissible, had been crossed. This argu-
ment was rejected by the trial court, and, as a consequence, Baldasar
was sentenced to a term of one to three years in the state peniten-
tiary.59 Relying upon its reading of Supreme Court precedent, the Illi-
nois Appellate Court also turned aside the creation of a collateral use
restriction for an Argersinger-allowable conviction.60
In an opinion denoted as a plurality in some quarters,6 ' and by
other courts labeled as a decision "divided in such a way that no rule
can be said to have resulted,"62 the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction. This end was reached through a 5-4 per curiam
effort that rested upon reasons expressed in three separate concurring
opinions that failed to agree upon a rationale.
Reduced to its most logical and intellectually defensible common
denominators, the decision represents three separate positions. Only
two of these actually addressed the issue then before the Court. Ironi-
cally, the approach taken by the four dissenting justices who would
have affirmed the Illinois court's action garnered the most support.
Justice Powell, writing for himself and three other members of the
Court,6 3 expressed a view that would have upheld the state's position.
Noting the distinction that had been drawn in respect to the initial
constitutional validity of the uncounseled felony and misdemeanor
convictions, these members felt a conviction considered proper under
the Sixth Amendment in the first instance retained that status for all
purposes and, therefore, could be used as a basis for enhancement.64
An opposite conclusion was reached in two concurring appraisals by
four other members of the Court. These concurring opinions used an
analysis described as a "but for" test 65 in a 1984 New Hampshire
Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Souter, then serving as a
state appellate judge. In a brief concurrence, Justice Stewart found
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. People v. Baldasar, 367 N.E.2d 459, 462 (IMI. App. Ct. 1979).
61. See, e.g., Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
62. United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981).
63. Justice Powelrs position was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White and
Justice Rehnquist. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
64. Id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting).
65. State v. Cook, 481 A.2d 823, 828 (N.H. 1984).
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the sanction imposed upon Baldasar improper because the defendant
had been "sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only be-
cause he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in which he had
not had the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense."66 This
separate opinion was joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens.
These two justices also joined the concurring opinion written by Jus-
tice Marshall who agreed that the penalty received would not have
been authorized by statute "but for" and as a direct consequence of the
earlier uncounseled conviction.67 But these three justices additionally
rejected the validity of Baldasar's initial misdemeanor itself with an
insistence that basing the guarantee of counsel upon the actual im-
prisonment standard of Scott was wrong.68 The failure of Justice
Stewart to endorse this latter attack upon the validity of the first con-
viction as opposed to the validity of its use is understandable. Only a
year earlier he had been in the Scott majority which had drawn the
disputed line.6 9
The fifth vote necessary for the resulting reversal was cast by Jus-
tice Blackmun. However, not wavering from the view he had ex-
pressed in his dissent in Scott,70 Justice Blackmun did not focus upon
the degree of permissible application with respect to the original mis-
demeanor but rather on an assessment of its initial standing. He
again proposed the adoption of a "bright line" rule that would afford
counsel whenever the prosecution involved either a potential punish-
ment in excess of six months or when a period of incarceration was
actually imposed.71 Applying this standard to Baldasar, the Justice
found that while not jailed as a result of the prior misdemeanor trial,
it had been for a crime with potential punishment of more than six
month's imprisonment. Therefore, given the absence of counsel that
his reading of the Sixth Amendment mandated, the first conviction
was completely invalid at the outset and foreclosed its use as a predi-
cate offense for enhancement purposes. 72 In effect, he declined to ap-
ply Scott.
In reaching its reversal of Baldasar's conviction, then, four justices
agreed that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, initially valid
under Scott because no jail time was imposed, could be used for pur-
66. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980)(Stewart, J., concurring)(emphasis
added).
67. Id. at 226-27 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 225 (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
70. Id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1980)(Blackmun, J., concurring). Ar-
guably, under this approach a "petty" offense that did not result in loss of liberty
could be considered valid for purposes of enhancement. See State v. Orr, 375
N.W.2d 171, 176 (N.D. 1985).
72. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 230 (1980)(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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poses of sentence enhancement.73 Four other justices specifically dis-
agreed on this point.74 However, of this latter group, three considered
the initial conviction constitutionally invalid75 while the fourth ad-
hered to its validity under Scott.76 The justice casting the deciding
vote chose not to express a view on whether an uncounseled convic-
tion, if valid under Scott, could subsequently be used for
enhancement.77
IV. APPLICATION OF BALDASAR AND THE NEED
FOR NICHOLS
Unlike justices of the United States Supreme Court, lower court
jurists found themselves more constrained than Justice Blackmun
and were not able to "pick and choose among Supreme Court prece-
dents." 78 In those courts' efforts to discern the proper scope of the
Baldasar decision, a spectacle of inconsistency developed. What was
most disconcerting about the range of the subsequent case analysis
was that at the extremes of the spectrum the conclusions were in di-
rect contradiction79 but with full intellectual honesty supported by the
Baldasar opinion. While the diversity of the interpretations do not
lend themselves readily to unconditional categorization, these lower
court opinions can be classified into four distinct groupings.
One of the four approaches was that of avoidance. A number of
courts made an effort to reconcile the varying rationales found in
Baldasar, but decided the analogous issue then before them ulti-
mately, or in the alternative, based upon an interpretation of their
state constitution.S0
73. Id. at 230-35 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., White & Rehnquist,
JJ.).
74. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Brennan & Stevens, JJ.), & 224-29
(Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan & Stevens, JJ.).
75. Id. at 225 (Marshall, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This is also the assessment of Justice
Brennan's position made by Justice Souter in Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
1921, 1929 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
78. This critical assessment was voiced in United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 415
(6th Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
79. Compare, e.g., State v. Chance, 405 S.E.2d 375 (S.C. 1991) (prior uncounseled
conviction constitutionally valid for all purposes, including sentence enhance-
ment, if defendant was not actually incarcerated on prior conviction) and State v.
Seavey, 472 A.2d 1379 (Me. 1984) (prior uncounseled conviction allowed because
the focus is not on reliability or nonreliability of the previous uncounseled convic-
tion, but on the mere fact of conviction) with, e.g., Sargent v. Commonwealth, 360
S.E.2d 895 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (prior uncounseled conviction valid for enhance-
ment purposed, even if defendant was not incarcerated on the prior conviction).
80. Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d 528 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d
171 (N.D. 1985); State v. Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1985). See also Peo-
ple v. Stratton, 384 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)(observing that given the
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The more traditional avenue, one which can be characterized as a
majority holding, was to find that a defendant's prior uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions, even those valid under Scott, could not be
used to enhance a sentence in any way.S1 The justification used to
support this application was primarily a combination of the end result
reached in Baldasar and a "but for" appraisal of the effect the uncoun-
seled predicate conviction had upon any subsequent penalty.
A third line of cases found support in Justice Blackmun's concur-
ring opinion in Baldasar. These holdings upheld the use of uncoun-
seled first convictions for recidivist purposes, including punishment,
as long as these convictions had not resulted in incarceration or had a
potential sentencing range exceeding six months.82 This was the
"bright line" that Justice Blackmun had found to separate the valid
from the invalid misdemeanor conviction.83 The lower courts which
adopted this position then extrapolated that Justice Blackmun would
join the four Baldasar dissenters in finding that, if valid in the first
instance, it would retain that potency for enhancement purposes.8 4
One variation on the "middle-ground" approach was to find Baldasar
restrictions not applicable if the effect of the prior uncounseled convic-
tion did not increase the possible maximum penalty or convert a mis-
demeanor offense into a felony.8 5
The final grouping was comprised of those opinions that essentially
found that an uncounseled conviction was valid for all purposes, in-
cluding enhancement.86 Significantly, this category was further sub-
divided into those cases that spoke of the prior uncounseled conviction
being valid under Scott,87 and those relying upon the status-created
rationale of Lewis.88 Under the latter of these two sub-categories, the
focus was not on "reliability or non-reliability of the previous uncoun-
seled conviction, but on the mere fact of conviction."89 At the time
state of federal law, states may feel free "to choose the view [of Baldasar] which
seems most appropriate").
81. E.g., State v. Laurick, 574 A.2d 1340 (N.J. 1990); People v. Stratton, 384 N.W.2d
83 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Ulibarri, 632 P.2d 746 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
82. Ilad v. State, 585 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1991); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57
(Pa. 1986).
83. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
84. Illad v. State, 585 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 1991); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507
A.2d 57, 61 (Pa. 1986).
85. E.g., United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990); Moore v. State,
352 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
86. E.g., State v. Chance, 405 S.E.2d 375, 376 (S.C. 1991); Sheffield v. City of Pass
Christian, 556 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Miss. 1990); State v. Seavey, 472 A.2d 1379
(Me. 1984).
87. E.g., State v. Chance, 405 S.E.2d 375 (S.C. 1991).
88. E.g., State v. ONeill, 473 A.2d 415 (Me. 1984). See supra notes 42-51 and accom-
panying text.
89. State v. ONeill, 473 A.2d 415, 419 (Me. 1984).
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Nichols was decided, either singularly or in tandem, this approach oc-
cupied a minority position as related to state recidivist statutes.
However, in the context of the 1987 federal sentencing guidelines9o
and its criminal history provisions,91 a very narrow reading of
Baldasar was the conventional thinking. Although a split in the cir-
cuits was present,9 2 a majority of the appellate courts that considered
the issue found no statutory or constitutional prohibition to counting
prior uncounseled convictions valid under Scott in calculating a de-
fendant's criminal history category for sentencing purposes.9 3 It was
in this historical environment that certiorari was ordered in Nichols.
90. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98
Stat. 1837, 2017-34 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)) estab-
lished the United States Sentencing Commission. This seven-member commis-
sion was charged with the responsibility to develop sentencing ranges to be used
in the federal system.
Justice Stephen Breyer was a member of the original commission and has
written that this congressional initiative had two goals. The first of these was to
bring "honesty" to federal criminal sentences. At the time, the Federal Parole
Commission in large measure controlled the point at which a prisoner could be
released despite the term of imprisonment handed down at trial. Accomplish-
ment of this goal was undertaken through the abolishment of parole for federal
prisoners. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTPA L. REV. 1 (Fall 1988).
The second goal was to reduce a wide disparity in sentencing then occurring
amongst federal judges for essentially identical and otherwise indistinguishable
crimes. In its effort to remedy this shortcoming, Congress empowered the com-
mission to develop standardized sentencing ranges which were to reflect the then
existing norm being imposed for similar crimes. The result was promulgation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Since November 1987, these Federal
Sentencing Guidelines have been the law. Id.
91. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides a sentencing table that
takes the form of a grid. To find the respective sentencing range on that grid one
needs to arrive at both an "offense level" and a "criminal history category."
Along the left hand margin of the grid (the vertical axis) is the defendant's
offense level. A defendant's position on this numerical scale is arrived at by total-
ing points assigned in the manual to specific characteristics of the offense itself.
Across the top of the grid (the horizonal axis) is reflected six criminal history
categories. A defendant's category is determined by assessing criminal history
points, which the manual provides, based upon prior criminal activities of the
individual defendant.
The sentencing range in months is determined by identifying the intersection
of the offense level and criminal history category. UNITED STATES SENTENCING
CoMnussIoN, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (Nov. 1993)
(sentencing tbl.).
92. Compare United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990) (Baldasar
does not preclude the use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions during sen-
tencing for a subsequent criminal offense) with United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d
844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. Opinions in three circuit courts of appeals would allow consideration of prior un-
counseled misdemeanor convictions for sentencing purposes. These were the
Sixth, Second and Fifth Circuits. See United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402,
415-18 (6th Cir. 1992), afftd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994); United States v. Castro-Vega,
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V. THE DECISION IN UNITED STATES v. NICHOLS
The petitioner, Kenneth 0. Nichols, had pleaded guilty to federal
felony drug charges in 1990. At his sentencing, in accordance with
federal sentencing guidelines, he was assessed a number of criminal
history points for previous convictions. 94 One of these points was as-
sessed for a 1983 state misdemeanor conviction for driving under the
influence (DUI) for which he was fined $250 but was not incarcer-
ated.95 The potential sentence for this misdemeanor was one year im-
prisonment and a fine of $1000.96 This additional point increased the
maximum sentence available under the guidelines.97
Nichols objected to the use of the DUI misdemeanor conviction to
arrive at his criminal history score because he was not represented by
counsel at that proceeding. It was his contention that to do so "would
violate the Sixth Amendment as construed in Baldasar."98 While ac-
cepting that the misdemeanor was uncounseled and there had been no
waiver as to the right to counsel, the district court rejected this argu-
ment. Using the prior uncounseled conviction to arrive at a criminal
history score, the court sentenced Nichols to the maximum term al-
lowed by the sentencing guidelines. This was a term of imprisonment
twenty-five months longer than would have been possible without the
prior uncounseled conviction.9 9 A divided panel of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.oo
The essence of finding Baldasar not applicable, both in the district
court and court of appeals, was a determination that limited the prece-
dent to its particular facts. Both courts found that preclusion of a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, not carrying an initial jail
sentence, was proper only when the effect of its consideration would be
to convert a misdemeanor into a felony-essentially the same result in
Baldasar.O1 Because these were not the circumstances in Nichols'
case, the courts concluded that the sentence was being correctly calcu-
lated. Moreover, each of the two lower courts noted that the sentenc-
945 F.2d 496, 500 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220
(5th Cir. 1990). When the Ninth Circuit considered the issue, it found that
Baldasar and the Sixth Amendment would not allow such use of an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction. United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir.
1991).
94. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1994). See supra notes 90-91.
95. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1994).
96. Id. at 1924 n.1.
97. Id. at 1925.
98. Id. at 1924.
99. Id. at 1925.
100. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1992), affid, 114 S. Ct. 921 (1994).
101. Id. at 417; United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Tenn. 1991) aff'd,
979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
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ing guidelines explicitly allowed for the inclusion of such prior
convictions.102
Upon finding its way to the United States Supreme Court, a major-
ity there also rejected Nichols' Sixth Amendment argument and af-
firmed the use of his DUI conviction for sentencing purposes. Taking
a position that aligned themselves with the dissenters in Baldasar,
five membersiOS of the Court found nothing in the sentencing proce-
dure to violate constitutional standards. In the majority's view, a pre-
vious conviction, valid under Scott, was sufficiently reliable enough on
its face to enhance a defendant's sentence upon conviction for a subse-
quent offense.
A sixth justicel0 4 concurred in the judgment, opting to read the
sentencing guidelines in respect to the use of a prior valid uncounseled
conviction as being "presumptive" in nature. Construed in this man-
ner, there would be an avenue open to an accused to go beyond the
face of a previous conviction and demonstrate its unreliability for pur-
poses of establishing "past criminal conduct or predicting the likeli-
hood of recidivism,"05 thereby making it "'constitutionally
permissible' for a federal court to 'consider a prior uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction' in sentencing a defendant under the sentencing
guidelines."o6 In adopting this construction, the "difficult constitu-
tional question.., need not be answered in deciding this case."107
The three remaining members of the Court'OS strenuously objected
to what they considered inherently unreliable convictions being used
in any way to increase punishment. Citing Burgett and Tucker, these
justices questioned why those rules applicable to uncounseled felony
convictions and premised on the notion that an uncounseled convic-
tion is too unreliable to support a prison sentence should not apply
equally to uncounseled misdemeanor convictions. They could see no
distinction between the two circumstances.10 9 In making this point,
the dissent noted that the case had already been made (and accepted)
that reliability concerns are just as real, if not more so, in an atmos-
102. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 417 (6th Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921
(1994); United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (D. Tenn. 1991) aff'd,
979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1992), aft'd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
103. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered this opinion for the Court and was joined by
Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas.
104. Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
105. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (1994)(Souter, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 1931 (citing language from the majority opinion).
107. Id. at 1929. Arguably, nothing in the majority's holding would prevent them from
eventually embracing such reasoning.
108. Justice Blackmun authored a dissent that was joined by Justice Stevens and Jus-
tice Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg filed a brief dissent in which she distinguished
her position in Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994).
109. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1935-36 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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phere of potential "assembly-line justice" that accompanies misde-
meanor prosecutions.'-o
The majority opinion did not directly address reliability concerns
but rather ground its logic on three premises. First, the majority
made an implicit assessment, not disputed by the dissent, that the
DUI conviction was valid under Scott.11 Second, a recognition, also
not questioned by the dissent, was made that enhancement statutes
"whether in the nature of criminal history provisions such as those
contained in the sentencing guidelines, or recidivist statutes which
are commonplace in state criminal laws, do not change the penalty
imposed for the earlier conviction."112 Third, and most significantly,
reliance on this conviction would be "consistent with the traditional
understanding of the sentencing process."113 The Court viewed the
sentencing component as "less exacting" than the process employed to
establish guilt. The opinion noted past criminal behavior was a rele-
vant sentencing factor independent of any criminal conviction for that
conduct. Moreover, the evidence needed to support consideration of
the conduct need only satisfy a preponderance standard of proof.114
Hence, consistent with due process, the majority explained that the
petitioner in the present case could have been sentenced more severely based
simply on evidence of the underlying conduct which gave rise to the previous
DUI offense.... Surely, then, it must be constitutionally permissible to con-
sider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction based on the same conduct
where that conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.11 5
The Court also turned aside Nichols' contention that due process
should require a misdemeanor defendant to be warned that his convic-
tion might be used for enhancement purposes should the defendant
later be convicted of another crime. The basis of this rejection was
two-fold: the absence of any such requirement to be found in Scott and
the impracticality of its implementation.116
VI. THE LOGIC OF NICHOLS OPENS MORE THAN ONE DOOR
The immediate holding of Nichols is important in its own right. It
resolves an issue that has badly splintered state and federal courts
110. Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) and Baldasar v. Illinois,
446 U.S. 222, 228 n.2 (1980)(Marshall, J., concurring)).
111. Id. at 1927.
112. Id. The dissent argued that this focus missed the mark for two reasons. First,
while there was no violation of double jeopardy it was "undeniable that Nichols'
DUI conviction directly resulted in more than two years' imprisonment." Second,
and more importantly, the present concern was not one of multiple punishment
but of reliability. Id. at 1933. (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens &
Ginsburg, JJ.).
113. Id. at 1927.
114. Id. at 1928.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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ever since Baldasar was decided in 1980. The Court has issued a clear
mandate "that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under
Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to
enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction."117 There should
also be no question that this rule applies in the context of both recidi-
vist statutes and criminal history provisions found in sentencing
guidelines.
However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court shifted its focus
from an inquiry of reliability to an assessment of historical references
reflecting "past criminal behavior." If, in fact, logic dictates that it is
"constitutionally permissible to consider a prior uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction based on the same conduct where that conduct
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt" then does it not extend to
even the uncounseled felony conviction? If the relevant concern is
"past criminal behavior," this would be the case even if the initial con-
viction was invalid in the first instance for lack of counsel. Any such
distinction between predicates that are valid or invalid for enhance-
ment purposes loses its definition if the focus is not upon the convic-
tion but the conduct it represents, particularly if the threshold for
establishing the behavior in question is a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Even if reliability in some way informs the enhancement proto-
col, the logical progression does not change. If a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction is sufficiently reliable to justify imposition of
an additional twenty-five month term of imprisonment because the in-
dividual is not being penalized under the first offense, then inquiry as
to counsel at the initial or predicate conviction also seems to lack
relevance.
Additionally, it should be recalled that LewisllS allowed an un-
counseled and, therefore, under Gideon, unlawful felony conviction to
serve as the basis for subjecting an individual to direct119 criminal
liability for possession of a firearm. The Court in Lewis perceived that
the federal gun law in question did not focus on reliability but on the
mere fact of conviction. The status of being "presumptively danger-
ous" was found by the Court to be a rational legislative judgment even
if an allegedly uncounseled conviction was being used to achieve it.120
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
119. The status of felon was an element of the crime that had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
120. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63-64, 67 (1980). The Court reasoned that
when one took into account Congress' legitimate concern for the easy availability
of firearms and the connection between firearms and violent crime:
Congress' judgment that a convicted felon, even one whose conviction
was allegedly uncounseled, is among the class of persons who should be
disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms because of potential dan-
gerousness is rational. Enforcement of that essentially civil disability
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Moreover, although the court was aware of Lewis at the point it de-
cided Baldasar,121 it did not in that opinion narrow or displace the
Lewis rationale.122 It remains "good authority" even today.123
In his concurring opinion in Nichols, Justice Souter pointed out
that under the federal sentencing guidelines
the role prior convictions play in sentencing is presumptive, not conclusive,
and a defendant has the chance to convince the sentencing court of the unreli-
ability of any prior valid but uncounseled convictions in reflecting the serious-
ness of his past criminal conduct or predicting the likelihood of recidivism. 124
If focus on a conviction is as a historical reference, Justice Souter's
comment could be amended to include even the "invalid" conviction.
In any case, if any analogy is to be drawn to the role of an uncounseled
conviction in sentencing, at least in the context of federal guidelines, it
more closely resembles Lewis than Burgett or Tucker.125
If drawn, this analogy opens the door to muting questions as to
whether a conviction is valid or invalid in the first instance. The em-
phasis would not be upon the conviction but the fact of that conviction
and what it represents for purposes of one's criminal history status.
Certainly, sentencing guidelines, whether state or federal, could be
written or interpreted so such activity would merit its inclusion within
a "presumptively dangerous" category.' 26 Much like a shot across a
ship's bow, the previous entanglement could be viewed as putting an
through a criminal sanction does not "support guilt or enhance punish-
ment.., on the basis of a conviction that is unreliable when one consid-
ers Congress' broad purpose."
Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
121. Even though Baldasar was argued in November 1979 and Lewis in January
1980, Lewis was decided two months before Baldasar. Lewis was decided on Feb-
ruary 27, 1980. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980). Baldasar was de-
cided on April 22, 1980. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
122. The only mention of Lewis in Baldasar is a reference found in a footnote to the
dissenting opinion. There, the dissenters noted the Baldasar "decision is all the
more puzzling in view" of the decision in Lewis. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S.
222, 234 n.3 (1980)(Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., White & Rehn-
quist, JJ.).
123. See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1736-37 (1994X(use of Lewis to sup-
port statutory interpretation that prior convictions used for sentence enhance-
ment not subject to collateral attack in sentencing proceedings). See also supra
note 39.
124. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (Souter, J., concurring)(emphasis
added).
125. The extension of the Nichols majority reasoning becomes more difficult to achieve
with recidivist statutes because those are normally channeled to considerations
of "prior convictions," a more conclusive approach. Still, if "conviction" is con-
strued to be a surrogate for conduct, it is not an insurmountable hurdle.
126. Additionally, Burgett and Tucker cannot be distinguished on the basis of "juris-
dictional error." The felony conviction at issue and found to be properly used in
Lewis was also based upon a "unique constitutional defect" which would be "juris-
dictional." See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
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individual on notice of the risk involved with any subsequent criminal
activity.
VII. CONCLUSION
The confusing and contradictory applications of Baldasar in the
lower courts dictated its reassessment. Now the Supreme Court has
held that "consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments...
an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no
prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punish-
ment at a subsequent conviction."127 However, to reach this conclu-
sion the Court did not simply rely upon the constitutional validity of
the first conviction or the fact that enhancement statutes "do not alter
or enlarge" the prior sentence.1 28 Rather, the Court shifted the in-
quiry from one of reliability to a broader question as to the function
served by sentencing provisions. Convictions then may be viewed es-
sentially as historical references reflecting past criminal conduct.
At a minimum, the concern for reliability that has provided a bul-
wark against the use of prior uncounseled convictions has been di-
luted by the logic employed to reach the result in Nichols. Toward the
other end of the spectrum, it provides the entree for reexamination of
the prohibition against the use of even uncounseled felony or invalid
misdemeanor convictions for purposes of sentencing. The latter would
be particularly true in the context of state or federal sentencing guide-
lines that are found to be "presumptive" in nature.
127. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994).
128. These positions were taken by the dissenters in Baldasar. Baldasar v. Illinois,
446 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1980)(Powell, J., dissenting).
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